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Abstract
This paper looks at whether firms’ credit ratings are negatively affected by litigation risk
after controlling for known factors that affect credit ratings. The conventional wisdom is that
litigation risk and credit ratings have an inverse relationship. However, my hypothesis is that the
inverse relationship will not be stable if the model of credit ratings has taken other factors into
account. The methodology first constructs a model of litigation risk, and then regress the credit
ratings on the measurement of litigation risk. Previous empirical research on litigation risk
measurement uses industry proxies as indicators for litigation risk. In this paper, I include firm
characteristics and the Beneish M-score (a determinant for earnings manipulation) in addition to
the industry proxy to construct an alternative model measuring litigation risk. I find that
supplementing the Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994a, b; hereafter FPS) industry proxy with
measures of firm characteristics improves predictive ability. In the model of credit ratings, I find
that the change of litigation risk has a negative correlation with the credit ratings. However, the
negative coefficient on the change of litigation risk changes to a positive one after controlling for
other variables such as firm size, return on asset, and interest coverage ratio. This finding
provides support for the hypothesis that the negative correlation between the credit ratings and
litigation risk is not stable. This suggests that credit ratings may not incorporate litigation risk
specifically although litigation can lead to firms’ financial damage and reputation crisis.
However, the negative coefficient on the change of litigation risk remains unchanged when I
control for the year fixed effects. I also find a negative correlation between the year 2007 and
credit ratings due to financial crisis. The results are not conclusive given the likely simultaneous
determination of litigation risk and credit ratings.
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Credit Ratings and Firm Litigation Risk
I. Introduction
In this paper, I examine whether firms’ credit ratings are negatively affected by litigation
risk if other factors such as firm characteristics are included in the model. I first construct a
model of litigation risk, and then use the measurement as a variable in the regression of credit
ratings. My paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I construct a new model to
measure the litigation risk by including variables such as Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994a,
b; hereafter FPS) industry proxy, firm size indicators, the Beneish M-score and firm
characteristics. Second, I use the model of litigation risk to obtain the estimated parameters on
independent variables to measure the level of litigation risk, which is then used in the model of
credit ratings to test the negative correlation between firms’ litigation risk and credit ratings.
Since I get a highly significant positive coefficient on the level of litigation risk, I also include
the change of litigation risk to test for consistency of correlation, and the litigation risk squared
to test for whether there is a convergence of the correlation in the long-term, controlling for other
related firm characteristics that affect credit ratings.
In the model of litigation risk, I find that supplementing the FPS industry proxy with
measures of firm characteristics improves predictive ability according to the increase in the
Pseudo-R-Squared. In the model of credit ratings, I find that the change of litigation risk has a
negative correlation with the credit ratings. However, the negative coefficient on the change of
litigation risk changes to a positive one after controlling for other variables such as firm size,
return on asset, and interest coverage ratio. This finding provides support for the hypothesis that
the negative correlation between the credit ratings and litigation risk is not stable. This suggests
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that credit ratings may not incorporate litigation risk specifically although litigation can lead to
firms’ financial damage and reputation crisis. However, I find that the negative correlation
between the change in litigation risk and credit ratings maintains the same after controlling for
the year fixed effects. Also, the year 2007 has a negative association with firms’ credit ratings,
which could be due to the financial crisis in 2007. The results are not conclusive given the likely
simultaneous determination of litigation risk and credit ratings.
Section II provides a literature review that discusses both litigation risk and credit ratings.
Section III introduces the research question and the methodology constructed in this paper.
Section IV details the sample and provides descriptive statistics of the data. Section V presents
the findings from the models and results of regressions. This section also includes a discussion of
endogeneity, which could have influenced the regression results. Section VI concludes.

II. Literature Review
a. Discussion of Litigation Risk
Previous study defines the litigation risk as the risk of securities class action lawsuits
(Skinner, 1994). According to Skinner, firms’ litigation risk generally is resulted from violations
of Rule 10b-5. The components of a Rule 10b-5 violation are “(1) a misstatement or omission of
(2) a material fact (3) made with intent (4) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on (5) causing
injury in connection with the purchase or sale of securities” (Skinner, 1994). Since fraud such as
an omission of a statement item or a misrepresentation of financial statements is the major
reasons for firms’ involvement in lawsuits, I provide below some meaningful findings from other
empirical research about the relationship between firms’ litigation risk and earnings disclosures.
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By examining the timeliness of total earnings news through the evolution of the
consensus analyst forecast, scholars discover that timely revelation of fraudulent earnings news
deter litigation for both settled and dismissed lawsuits (Donelson et al., 2012). For example,
firms which reveal fraudulent earnings news early will lower the likelihood of litigation. Other
literature that investigates firm disclosure and litigation risk emphasizes the internal relationship
between these two. Donelson also finds that disclosure endogenously leads to litigation against
firms. By using simultaneous equations methodology, Donelson was able to show that (1) firms
with higher litigation risk are more likely to make early disclosures about impending earnings
disappointments (preemption effect), and (2) such disclosures lower the expected lawsuit
probability (Field et al., 2005).
Later research has focused more on other factors that potentially affect firms’ litigation
risk when constructing models of litigation risk measurement. Some studies use a variant of an
industry membership called FPS proxy created by Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994a, b),
who draw firms from four risky industries to study the relationship between litigation and
disclosure; these industries are biotech, computer, electronics, and retail industry. For example,
many studies use some form of dummy variable for membership in the FPS industries to
measure litigation risk (e.g. Brown and Tucker, 2011; Donelson et al., 2010; Hribar et al., 2010).
However, Kim and Skinner (2012) point out that the credibility and accuracy of a fixed industry
proxy are not convincing since litigation rates in particular industries vary over time. If the
changes in the wealth of different industries happen because of the volatile macroeconomic
environment, litigation risk is not likely to be sustainable for particular industries or firms.
Instead, it is more likely that economic downturns will cause losses in value that vary across
industries and through time, and that these losses will lead to litigation (Kim, Skinner, 2012).
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This means that the FPS industry proxy should not be the only variable to measure litigation risk
since it is hard to identify and categorize firms and industries that always have higher possibility
of litigation risk.
Other than an industry membership proxy, there are firm and industry characteristics that
make particular firms and industries generally more likely to be involved in litigation (e.g. Kim,
Skinner, 2012). Some models of litigation risk include firm characteristics such as market
capitalization, stock volatility and stock turnover based on the hypothesis that fraud in Rule 10b5 litigation depends on the size of the change in stock price, the magnitude of trading volume
during the period of the susceptible fraud, and the stock price of public listed firms (Jones and
Weingram, 1996a). Jones and Weingram (1996a) also find that a bigger amount of financial
damages makes firms more likely to become a target for plaintiffs’ attorneys, which indicates
that market value is strongly associated with litigation risk as well. Studies interpret a positive
correlation between equity-based managerial motivations and the probability of a lawsuit (such
as for financial statement misrepresentation and fraud) as evidence that equity-based
compensation leads to misbehaviors of the administrative bodies (Low 2006). Further research
find that firms that operate in high litigation risk environments provide more equity-based
compensation to their CEOs (Jayaraman, Milbourn, 2009). CEOs who have performance-based
compensation have incentives to be involved in aggressive financial reporting and other types of
opportunistic behavior that increases likelihood of lawsuits (Dechow et al., 1996). Previous
research also includes several proxies for the nature of the firms’ investment opportunities, such
as Working Capital, Market-to-Book ratio, Research &Development intensity, and ratio of
Property Plant & Equipment to total assets, which affect corporate policies such as executive
compensation, capital structure, and payout policy that could affect litigation risk (Smith and
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Watts, 1992). Kim and Skinner (2012) also include the ratio of goodwill to assets to measure the
extent of the firms’ Merger & Acquisition activities, which likely increases litigation risk.
While corporate governance and insider trading variables are also possible indicators of
the optimism of management that increase firms’ exposure to litigation, there are problems and
limitations to include these variables in litigation risk measurement. First, it is not clear whether
prior securities litigation is caused by opportunism in the management team instead of being
driven by unexpectedly negative outcomes. While it is obvious that extreme forms of
opportunism such as earnings management lead to litigation, these lawsuits are from a relatively
small part of the population of securities class action suits. Second, corporate governance and
insider trading data are not fully disclosed and publicly available compared to data on firm
characteristics which constrains sample sizes and perhaps leads to a biased sample selection
(Kim, Skinner, 2012).

b. Discussion of Credit Ratings from Credit Agencies
Major credit rating agencies, including Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s have
become an important subject of investigation and legislation given their complex structure of
rating systems and conflict of interest, which are criticized by many regulative bodies and
legislative bodies (Zhou, Kumar, 2012). For example, rating agencies have been criticized for
their credit rating analysis and organization administration after the scandal of Enron and the
mortgage crisis during the financial distress in the early 2000s. Zhou and Kumar (2012) state that
the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech are frequently used for credit agencies to
protect themselves against civil liability for their ratings. As information intermediaries on behalf
of bondholders, credit agencies collect and process issuers’ financial information, as well as
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produce estimates of default risk in the form of ratings (Gorton, Winton, 2003). Since the rating
agencies perform undisclosed investigations and are paid by bond issuers instead of investors,
many scholars are concerned about the possibility that importance of reputation, litigation and
competition will be incentives for a conflict of interest (Kraft, 2008). Kraft gives the following
examples in her paper: reputational concerns could be a motivation for rating agencies to expend
effort to learn more in a setting in which the agency optimally chooses coarse ratings without
sufficient evidence; the impact of legal liability can lead to “misrating” on the rating agency’s
behavior; and the higher legal liability induces the rating agency to reduce the number of ratings.
If the legal liability increases asymmetrically, which means that higher legal liability only for
ratings deemed later to be too high, the rating agency would then increase its downward bias in
ratings to respond (Goel, Thakor, 2010).

III. Methodology and Research Question
a. Research Question
Given the conflict of interests and the “black box” of agencies’ rating systems, I want to
investigate the correlation between firms’ litigation risk and credit ratings through a regression
that controls for other firm characteristics. There is little research that has done an explicit
analysis of the correlation between firms’ litigation risk and credit ratings. If we assume rating
agencies are efficient information processing intermediaries, the conventional wisdom is that
higher litigation risk will result in a lower credit rating since a higher litigation risk increases the
probability of lawsuits, which either increases financial damage or decreases expected return on
the business operations of firms. However, the negative correlation between litigation risk and
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credit ratings will not be stable if credit agencies only use a rough indicator of litigation risk
which is easily affected by other factors considered in the rating system. Also, credit agencies
may only put little weight on litigation risk relative to other factors influencing the rating result.
Thus, the litigation risk will not be negatively correlated with the credit rating or the correlation
may not be statistically significant if the model includes other known factors that affect credit
ratings.

b. Measuring Litigation Risk
To construct a model of litigation risk, I include FPS industry proxy, firm characteristics,
and firm size indicators as variables in the measurement. Since previous studies find that the
firms’ earning disclosure is correlated with litigation risk, I also include the Beneish M-score in
the model of litigation risk, which measures the likelihood of earnings manipulation. I will
explain the rationale for using each variable in detail in the following paragraphs.
The model of litigation risk is:
Sued=β0+β1(FPSPROXY)+β2(MKVALT)+β3(BKMK)+β4(WC)+β5(FINRK)+β6(VOLATILITY)
+β7(PE)+β8(GP)+β9(RDINTEN)+β10(BMSCORE)+β11(BIG)+β12(SMALL)+ε
A number of papers use some variant of the FPS industry proxy for litigation risk. For
example, Field (2005) uses industry membership to measure litigation risk but develops their
own measure by looking at industry litigation rates during the period before the sample test
period (1988-1994) and sorting industries according to whether they had litigation rates above or
below the median. In my paper, I use a dummy variable for membership in the FPS industry to
measure litigation risk.
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Fama and French (1992) use market capitalization and book-to-market ratios to explain
cross-sectional variation on market returns. In my paper, I use these two variables to indicate the
market risk, which is defined as “the risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions arising
from movements in market prices” (Fama, French, 1992). The market capitalization is measured
as the total market value (MKVALT). Book-to-market equity ratio is measured as the book value
per share (BKVLPS) multiplied by common shares outstanding (CSHO), then divided by the
market value. I also included the working capital, which was calculated as the difference
between the total current asset (ACT) and the total current liability (LCT).
Previous literature argues that high assets and investment in working capital increase
rating change (Sufi, 2009). Thus, I include the level of working capital measured as the
difference between the total current assets and the total current liabilities. I also include the
indicator of financial risk, stock volatility and price/earnings ratio to predict the firm’s future
performance. The PP&E over total assets ratio indicates the fixed cost and the risk of financial
distress for a company, which predicts the information of financial risk. I also include stock
volatility, calculated by the difference between the annual closing price (PRCC_F) at time (t) and
the annual closing price (PRCC_F) at time (t-1) divided by the annual closing price (PRCC_F) at
time (t-1). The stock price over earnings ratio was calculated by dividing the annual closing price
(PRCC_F) over basic earnings per share excluding extraordinary items (EPSPX). The stock
volatility and P/E ratio indicate the satisfaction of investors and shareholders, decreasing the
leverage of a company. These three factors thus reduce agency risk and information risk.
Cantor and Packer (1995) contend that the higher the profit, the lower the likelihood of
financial distress and default, which leads to firms’ higher ratings. Thus, I include the gross
profit (GP) in my model. Firms which practice R&D activities reduce their risk of debt
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significantly. Previous literature also shows that goodwill over asset ratio indicates the likelihood
of a firm’s future involvement in a merger and acquisition (Kim, Skinner, 2012). Thus I include
the research and development expense (XRD) over total assets ratio, which indicates the stability
of firms’ corporate governance. I also include two binary variables as indicators for big firms and
small firms since I think the top 25% and the bottom 25% of firms (in terms of firm size) will be
expected to have an effect on the level of litigation risk.
Finally, I include the Beneish M-Score which looks to determine whether a company has
manipulated its earnings. This model consists of eight ratios that capture either financial
statement distortions resulted from earnings manipulation (DSR, AQI, DEPI and Accruals) or
indicate a predisposition towards engagement in earnings manipulation (GMI, SGI, SGAI,
LEVI). The predictive ratios focusing on financial statement distortions capture unusual
accumulations in receivables (DSR, indicative of revenue inflation), unusual expense
capitalization and declines in depreciation (AQI and DEPI, both indicative of expense deflation),
and the extent to which reported accounting profits are supported by cash profits (Accruals).The
Beneish M-Score has been shown to correctly identify 76% of manipulators on an out of sample
basis (Beneish, 1999).
The original M-Score formula is:
M-Score = -4.84 + 0.92*DSRI + 0.528*GMI + 0.404*AQI + 0.892*SGI + 0.115*DEPI –
0.172*SGAI + 4.679*TATA – 0.327*LVGI
Where,
Factor

Name

DSRI

Days’ Sales in Receivables

Formula
Receivables / Total Sales

Basis
This Year /
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Index

Last Year

GMI

Gross Margin Index

Gross Profit / Total Sales

Last Year /
This Year

AQI

Asset Quality Index

(Non-Current Assets – PP&E) / Total
Assets

This Year /
Last Year

SGI

Sales Growth Index

Total Sales

This Year /
Last Year

DEPI

Depreciation Index

Depreciation / (Depreciation + Net
PP&E)

Last Year /
This Year

SGAI

SG&A Expense Index

SG&A / Revenues

This Year /
Last Year

TATA

Total Accruals to Total
Assets

(Working Capital – Cash) –
Depreciation/ Total Assets

This Year /
Last Year

LVGI

Leverage Index

Total Debt / Total Assets

This Year /
Last Year

The total sale is measured as the average net sales. The total debt is measured as the sum of debt
in current liabilities and the total long-term debt. In this original model, Beneish found that firms
that scored greater than -2.22 were more likely to be earnings manipulators.
Dependent Variable
Regarding the dependent variable, I include a binary variable to indicate if the firm has
been involved in a lawsuit since 1995. I obtained data on filings of the Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse (SCAC). The SCAC provides detailed information relating to the prosecution,
defense, and settlement of federal class action securities fraud litigation. The SCAC team
maintains a Filings database of more than 3,800 securities class action lawsuits filed since the
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The database has concentrated
resources on the data gathering methodologies. The SCAC does not track lawsuits filed in state
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court where there is no parallel federal civil class action, nor does it track SEC enforcement
proceedings when there is no parallel federal civil class action (SCAC website).

c. Measuring the Relationship between Credit Ratings and Litigation Risk
After constructing a model of litigation risk, I estimate the firms’ predicted litigation risk
over the time period given the coefficients and constant that I find in the regression. Then I
calculate the difference in litigation risk between the first year recorded and the last year
recorded for each firm in sample. Since the regression of credit ratings on the predicted litigation
risk finds a highly significant positive coefficient on the independent variable, I also include the
change of litigation risk from the previous year to the current year to see if the positive
correlation still exists. Another independent variable is the litigation risk squared since I want to
test if there is a convergence of the correlation in the long-term. I use the current credit ratings
from Standard & Poor Quality Ratings on the CRSP/Compustat merged database.
The model of credit ratings is:
Ratings=β0+β1 (LITIGATIONR) +β2 (CHANGELITIGATIONR) + β3 (LITIGATIONR2) +β4
(FIRMSIZE) +β5 (CAPSTRUC) +β6 (ROA) +β7 (ROE) +β8 (OANCF) +β9 (INTCOV) +ε
I include several control variables other than litigation risk, which can potentially affect
the credit ratings. The first control variable is firm size. Firm size is an indicator of economies of
scale in both aspects of production and organization, thus the size of a firm is expected to affect
the investment opportunity and future growth (Smith, Watts 1992). Altamuro (2009) argues that
larger companies are more likely than smaller firms to get a high credit rating due to their good
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reputation and diversification. I measure the firm size by the log of the samples’ total assets,
which is also included as one of the variables in the Altamuro (2009) paper.
The way of financing for finance business operations affects the financial structure of
firms. Thus, capital structure measured as debt to equity ratio indicates the financial risk, the
creditor risk, and the growth opportunities. Kisgen (2006) confirms that ratings react differently
to the leverage since there is a trend of downgrade after lowering leverage due to the decision of
capital structure of a firm. Thus, I measure the capital structure as a ratio of total debt (long-term
debt DLTT + debt in current liabilities DLC) over equity (SEQ).
To control for the impact of financial risk, I include the return of asset (ROA) as a proxy
for profitability, which was calculated as net income (NI) over total assets (AT). I also include
the return on equity (ROE), which was calculated as net income (NI) /total shareholders’ equity
(SEQ). Both ROA and ROE are important measurements of firms’ performance and future
profitability, thus these two ratios largely affect the decisions of shareholders and the ratings
from credit agencies.
In order to measure the health of ongoing business, I include the operating cash flow
(OANCF). Another control variable is the interest coverage calculated as earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT) divided by the interest or related expense (XINT) for long-term debt. Both the
health of operating activities and the ability to pay back creditors are important indicators for
credit agencies to be aware of when creating ratings.
Dependent Variable
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I use the S&P Quality Ranking as a dependent variable, which is an appraisal of past
performance of a stock's earnings and dividends and the stock's relative standing as of a
company's current fiscal year-end. Growth and stability of earnings and dividends are key
elements in establishing Standard & Poor's quality rankings for Common or Ordinary Stock. In
the sample, firms have ratings of A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C, D, I range them from 1 to 8, where 1
is the lowest rating and 8 is the highest.

IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics
a. The Model of Litigation Risk
I obtained data on firm characteristics from CRSP/Compustata merged database from
year 2003 to 2013. I searched the entire database in order to get a large sample and diverse
distribution of industries in the sample. Thus, I got a total number of 9,658 firms. Excluding the
firms that do not have sufficient data regarding firm characteristics that I use in the model of
litigation risk, I got 7,519 firms left with sufficient data. Table 1, Panel A provides the definition
of data and the calculation method of variables in the model of litigation risk.
Table 2, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics in the model of litigation risk. The
mean of the market value is U.S. $3948.17. Using the market value of firms, the first quartile
which is the market value below or equal to U.S. $89.2101 is marked “1” in the binary variable
of small firm indicator. Similarly, the last quartile which is the market value above or equal to
U.S. $1748.702 is marked “1” in the binary variable of big firm indicator. Table 2, Panel A (1)
provides correlation between variables in the model of litigation risk.
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Previous literature suggests that the FPS industries tend to have litigation rates that
exceed the overall rate (Skinner et al. 2012). To include the FPS industry proxy, I used a binary
variable to show the industry membership. Firms included in FPS industries are marked “1” as
highly risky industries. According to the FPS industry membership, highly risky industries
include: biotech firms (classified as firms in SIC codes 2833-2838 and 8731-8734), computer
firms (classified as firms in SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics firms (classified
as firms in SIC codes 3600-3674), and retail firms (classified as firms in SIC codes 5200-5961).
The Beneish M-Score determines whether a company has manipulated its earnings. The
mean of -3.80 indicates that on average sample firms do not have intention of manipulating
earnings given Beneish’s estimation that a score above -2.22 indicates earnings manipulation.
Table 1, Panel B provides the detail of the variables in calculating the BM-Score.
I obtained data on filings of securities class action lawsuits from the Stanford Law School
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The data started in 1995 and continue through the
present. I includeed lawsuits filed against public companies since the data on firm characteristics
is only applied to publicly traded firms (listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ), excluding
the IPO allocation, mutual fund, and analyst lawsuits. The binary sued variable indicates whether
the firm has been since 1995 when filings data became available. I also collected the number of
lawsuits that one firm had in the given time period of the database used as one of the variables
for measuring the relationship between credit ratings and litigation risk. Table 3, Panel A and
Panel B provide the number of lawsuits by year and sector.

b. The Model of Credit Ratings
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I used the credit ratings from Standard & Poor Quality Ranking in the current period
provided by CRSP/Compustat merged dataset. The S&P Quality Ranking provides an indicator
of past performance of a firm’s stock earnings and performance as of a firm’s current fiscal yearend. Growth and stability of earnings and dividends are key elements in establishing the rating
for Common/Ordinary stock. Table 1, Panel C provides the definition of variables in the model
of credit ratings, including the control variables definition.
The S&P Quality Rating has score as A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C, D. Thus, I ranked the
rating into a scale of eight. In my sample, eight is the best rating as A+ and one is the worst
rating as D. The litigation risk is an independent variable measured by the predictions using the
parameters gained from the litigation risk model. I also included the change of litigation risk
from this year to last year’s level and the litigation risk squared to test for convergence. The
control variables are firm size, capital structure measured as the debt to equity ratio, return on
asset, return on equity, operating cash flow, and interest coverage ratio.

V. Results
a. Litigation Risk Probit Regression
I report descriptive statistics in Table 2. Panel A reports means and medians for the
variables used in the model of litigation risk. Mean market value for these firms is U.S. $3948m
with the book-to-market ratio of 7.73. Both the working capital and the BM-score have a
negative skewness. The mean BM-score is -3.8, indicating the mean does not show a sign of
earnings manipulation.
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Panel A (1) of Table 2 reports correlations among the variables in the model of litigation
risk. The indicator of litigation is positively correlated with the market value (0.168), change in
market value (0.074), working capital (0.065), gross profit (0.166), R&D intensity (0.065), big
firm indicator (0.173) and FPS proxy (0.180). The indicator is negatively correlated with bookto-market ratio (-0.003), firm financial risk (-0.048), stock volatility (-0.005), price/earnings ratio
(0.010), BM-score (-0.013), and small firm indicator (-0.170). The market value and gross profit
drive litigation risk the most because of the large positive correlation. The firm size indicator
suggests that the bigger the firm, the more likely it is to be involved in lawsuits. On the other
hand, the smaller the firm, the less likely it is to be involved in lawsuits. FPS proxy is positively
correlated with market value (0.022), change in market value (0.013), working capital (0.051),
gross profit (0.017), and R&D intensity (0.276). It is negatively correlated with book-to-market
ratio (-0.003), firm financial risk (-0.146), stock volatility (-0.003), and price/earnings ratio (0.009), big firm indicator (-0.039) and small firm indicator (-0.003). It is consistent that the FPS
dummy variable is associated with variables that drive litigation risk.
Table 4 reports the results of binomial probit regression of the lawsuit dummy variable on
the FPS dummy variable, big firm indicator, small firm indicator, and the other firm
characteristics variables. The first model uses only the FPS industry dummy (Model 1). The
coefficient on this variable is positive and highly significant, indicating that FPS industry
membership increases the probability of litigation. Though the coefficient on the FPS variable is
significantly correlated to firms’ litigation risk in this model, overall goodness of fit and
predictive ability are low according to the Pseudo-R-squared of 2.86%.
The next models (denoted 2-4) that report probit regressions include the market value,
book-to-market ratio, working capital, firm financial risk, stock volatility, price to earnings ratio,
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gross profit, research & development intensity, BM-score, big-firm indicator, small-firm
indicator and the FPS proxy dummy variable. Market value and working capital are positively
associated with litigation risk, indicating that higher market capitalization and operational
liquidity lead to higher litigation risk. Book-to-market value is negatively associated with
litigation risk, implying that overvalued firms are likely to be involved in lawsuit cases. The firm
financial risk is measured as the proportion of the tangible assets. The negative coefficient is
consistent with the hypothesis that tangible assets serve as a cushion if a firm is involved in
financial distress. Though the stock volatility is negatively associated with litigation risk, the
magnitude is small and the coefficient is not statistically significant. A higher price to earnings
ratio suggests that investors are expecting higher earnings growth in the future compared to firms
with a lower P/E ratio, thus it is negatively associated with litigation risk. Both gross profit and
R&D intensity have positive coefficients, indicating that higher profits and investment in future
research and development are positive signals to creditors and investors, thus decreasing
litigation risk. The Beneish M-score has less impact on litigation risk compared to firm size
indicator. However, according to the coefficients, big firms are more likely to have higher risk
whereas small firms are not. FPS Proxy is also positively associated with litigation risk and is
statistically significant in these models, with a marginal effect of 0.152 in Model 4. It indicates
that FPS industry membership increases the probability of litigation by 15.2%. At a 1%
significance level, firm financial risk decreases the probability of litigation by 11.2% and R&D
intensity increases the probability of litigation risk by 7.88%. Big firm indicator increases the
litigation by 9.90% and small firm indicator decreases the litigation risk by 13.7%.

b. Credit Ratings OLS Regression
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I report descriptive statistics in Table 2. Panel B reports means and medians for the variables
in the model of credit ratings. Mean firm size for these firms is U.S. $2.46m with debt-to-equity
ratio of 0.524. Both capital structure and return on assets have a negative skewness. Mean
interest coverage ratio is 44, indicating that most firms in my sample, regardless of industry, are
generating sufficient cash to cover its interest payments.
Panel B (1) of Table 2 reports correlations among the variables in the model of credit ratings.
The ratings have a positive correlation with every variable; and only the correlations of change in
litigation risk and capital structure are not statistically significant at better than 1% level.
Table 5 reports the results of regression of the credit ratings on the litigation risk
measured in the previous model, change in the litigation risk, the level of litigation risk squared
and other control variables. Model 1 uses only the level of litigation risk. Surprisingly, the
coefficient on this variable is positive and highly statistically significant. Then I include the
change in the level of litigation risk of one year with respect to the previous year and the
litigation risk squared to see if the results change. It turns out that the change in litigation risk has
a negative association with the litigation risk and is statistically significant at 5% significance
level. Since the level of litigation risk is effectively a zero or one variable in terms of values.
This means that it is mean reverting and is negatively correlated with change in litigation risk.
Thus, I only include the change in litigation risk in the Model 3. I also include other control
variables in Model 3 such as firm size, capital structure measured as debt-to-equity ratio, return
on asset, return on equity, operating cash flow, and interest coverage ratio. The change in
litigation risk has a positive coefficient in Model 3 but is not statistically significant. All the
control variables are positively associated with litigation risk. The coefficient of capital structure
is the only one that is not statistically significant in the regression.
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According to the marginal effects, at a 1% significance level, the additional increase in
firm size increases the ratings by 61.9%; the additional increase in return on asset increases the
ratings by 7.01%; the additional increase in operating cash flow increases the ratings by 0.004%;
and the additional increase in the interest coverage ratio increases the ratings by 0.0027%. Firm
size, ROA, operating cash flow, and interest rate coverage are significantly correlated with credit
ratings in a positive sign. The coefficient on ROE is significant at 10% level. However, I do not
find significance of the coefficient on the capital structure.
Without controlling for other firm characteristics and with a single variable of litigation
risk, the credit rating is highly significant correlated with litigation risk in a positive sign. In
order to test for the consistency of this relationship, I include change in litigation risk and
litigation risk squared. I find that the change in litigation risk is negatively associated with credit
rating at a 5% significance level. The highly significant and positive correlation between the
litigation risk squared and credit ratings suggests that the relationship can be exponential instead
of linear.

c. Discussion of Fixed Effects
In my sample, there are 7,519 firms and data of firm characteristics observed from year
2003 to 2013. Since the change in a firm’s fiscal years and the differences among firms can
cause an effect on the credit ratings as dependent variable, I want to investigate the fixed effects
of firms and that of years.
First, I generated a panel data for both firms’ SIC codes and fiscal years. However, it is
not applicable to create a dummy variable for each firm due to the large number of observations.
Furthermore, I expect that there would not be many changes in coefficients on independent
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variables in the model of credit ratings since the results have already applied to a population of
firms. On the other hand, the industry fixed effects, which I included as a FPS proxy in the
measurement of litigation risk, is more relevant to credit ratings because it describes the
difference in economic environment and job functions.
After creating a dummy variable for firms, I was able to control the year fixed effect in
the credit ratings model. There are no big changes in the coefficient of the independent variables
included in the model in terms of magnitudes and signs. Nevertheless, the negative correlation
between the change in litigation risk and credit ratings remains the same after including other
factors in the model, which is contrary to what I found in the model of credit ratings without
controlling for year fixed effects. I also find that the year 2007 has a negative coefficient with the
ratings, which contradicts to the positive coefficient of all other fiscal years. It is not surprising
since firms tend to have financial problems and downward performance during the financial
crisis in year 2007 and 2008, thus decreasing their ratings provided by agencies.

d. Discussion of Endogeneity

There is a problem of endogeneity in this paper because of an endogenous influence
between firms’ litigation risk and credit ratings. The credit ratings as a dependent variable is
correlated with the change in litigation risk as an independent variable. And the change in
litigation risk also has an effect on the credit ratings of firms. Another source of endogeneity of
this model can come from omitted variable. Though I have controlled for other factors in the
model of credit ratings, there can be potentially other omitted variables that significantly affect
credit ratings. In this case, the shift of sign on the coefficient of the change in litigation risk can
be affected by an omitted variable that is strongly correlated with credit ratings as well as the
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change in litigation risk. The problem of endogeneity can introduce bias in the regression
coefficient of the OLS regression of credit ratings.
One of the ways to address the problem of endogeneity is to find instrumental variables.
In the model of credit ratings, an effective instrumental variable will be a variable that we can be
fairly certain that it has an effect on the independent variable i.e. the change in the litigation risk
but not on the dependent variable i.e. the credit ratings. A best instrumental variable should be
randomly selected but satisfied all the conditions mentioned above (University College London:
Environmental Econometrics).
Some possible instruments include the compensation for CEOs and geographic location
which implies information about population, average income level and socioeconomic status.
However, I find that most firms choose their incorporated location because of other factors such
as tax environment, cost saving, and logistics access. Another possibility is firm size. It makes
more sense to measure it as market capitalization, which means I need to drop the market value
variable in the model of litigation risk, which is a highly significant variable in the probit
regression. Developing an instrumental variable approach to deal with potential endogeneity is
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is a worthwhile avenue for future research.

VI. Conclusion
In this paper, I provide two empirical models: one is an alternative model of litigation
risk, and the other is a model of credit ratings on the change of litigation risk, controlling for
other relevant variables. I define litigation risk as the risk of private securities class action
lawsuits. According to previous studies, litigation rates in the four FPS industries
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(biotechnology, computers, electronics, and retail) are consistently higher than those in other
industries. I find that FPS proxy measure is highly correlated with litigation risk since the
coefficient on this variable is both economically and statistically significant. However, the ability
of this variable to predict litigation is modest given a small Pseudo-R-squared of 2.86%. When
the FPS variable is augmented with measures of firm characteristics such as market value,
working capital, stock volatility and R&D intensity, predictive ability increases markedly,
suggesting that the inclusion of the firm characteristics can result in significant improvements in
model performance.
The main contribution of this paper includes constructing a new model that measures
litigation risk and examines the negative relationship between firms’ litigation risk and credit
ratings. By supplementing the FPS industry proxy with measures of firm characteristics, the
predictive ability of the model measuring litigation risk improves. This suggests that industry
membership is not the only factor that affects firms’ litigation risk. When we assess firms’
litigation risk to predict their likelihood of involvement in lawsuits, it is important to consider
both systematic risk from industry and macro-economic environment and firm-specific risk
measured by firm characteristics such as market capitalization, book-to-market ratio and stock
volatility. In the model of credit ratings, I find that the change of litigation risk has a negative
correlation with the credit ratings. However, the negative coefficient on the change of litigation
risk changes to a positive one after controlling for other variables such as firm size, return on
asset, and interest coverage ratio. This is surprising because litigation risk in and of itself can
cause severe financial damage and reputational crisis. The result implies that the credit ratings of
firms from a credit agency may not incorporate a single factor specifically, such as litigation risk.
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Analysts or investors need to look at different factors that significantly affect firms’ credibility
instead of relying completely on the credit ratings provided by agencies.
I used the suggested model of litigation risk to generate the level of litigation risk over
the years in the sample. I also calculated the change in the litigation risk from this year to the
previous year’s level and the litigation risk squared to see if there is a convergent effect. The
result of the regression suggests that the change in the litigation risk is negatively correlated with
the credit ratings. I excluded the level of litigation risk since it is effectively a zero one variable,
which is mean reverting. Nevertheless, I find that the negative correlation shifts to a positive one
when I control for the variables that can potentially affect credit ratings such as firm size, capital
structure, and return on equity. Furthermore, I created a year dummy variable to control for the
year fixed effects. I find that the negative correlation between the change in litigation risk and
credit ratings sustains even after including other factors that potentially affect credit ratings in the
model, which is contrary to what I find in the previous model of credit ratings without
controlling for year fixed effects. I also find that the year 2007 has a negative coefficient with the
ratings, which contradicts to the positive coefficient of all other fiscal years. It is not surprising
since firms tend to have financial damages and downward performance during the financial crisis
in year 2007 and 2008, thus downgrading their ratings provided by agencies. The shifting sign
can also be aroused due to the problem of endogeneity, which could possibly be caused by
omitted variables. The issue of endogeneity needs to be further addressed in future research.
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Appendix
Table 1
Variable Definition
This table provides definitions of the variables used in the regression.
For all non-stock return and volatility, the year t represents the fiscal year of the company.
Panel A. Variables of measurement of litigation risk
Variable
Definition
SUED
Defined as a binary variable that 0 represents no lawsuit in the past, 1 represents lawsuit existed in the past
CHANGEMKVALT The change of market value of a firm from time t-1 to time t
MKVALT
Market value for single issue companies is common shares outstanding multiplied by the month-end price
that corresponds to the period end date
BKMK
Book-to-market equity ratio is measured as the book value divided by the market value. The book value is
defined as the multiplication of the book value per share and common shares outstanding
WC
Working capital is measured as the difference between the total current asset and the total current liability.
The total current asset is the sum of:
(1)cash and short-term investments (2)current assets (3)inventories (4)receivables;
The total current liability is the sum of:
(1)accounts payable (2)current liabilities (3)debt in current liabilities (4)income taxes payable
FINRK
The information in financial risk is measured as the total net property, plant, and equipment divided by the total assets
VOLATILITY
The stock volatility is calculated by the difference between the annual closing price at time t and
the annual closing price at time t-1 divided by the annual closing price at time t-1
PE
The price/earnings ratio is calculated by dividing the annual closing price over basic earnings per share
excluding extraordinary items
GP
According to U.S. and Canadian GAAP definition, the gross profit is the difference of sales/turnover (net)
less cost of goods sold
RD INTEN
The intensity of research and development is calculated by dividing the research and development expense over
Total assets. The research and development expense includes software expenses, amortization of software costs,
and company-sponsored research and development
FPSPROXY
A binary variable as indicator of FPS industry membership in the sample
BIG
A binary variable as indicator of big firms, which is the first quartile of firms in terms of the market value
SMALL
A binary variable as indicator of small firms, which is the last quartile of firms in terms of the market value
BMSCORE
The Beineish M-score determines whether a company has manipulated its earnings. The formula is
M-Score = -4.84 + 0.92*DSRI + 0.528*GMI + 0.404*AQI + 0.892*SGI + 0.115*DEPI – 0.172*SGAI + 4.679*TATA – 0.327*LVGI.
(Factors defined in Panel B)
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Panel B. Variables of the BM-Score formula
(All the index is defined as the ratio of this year over last year)
Variable

Definition

DSRI

Days' sales in receivables index is measured as the receivables divided by total sales

GMI

The gross margin index is measured as the gross profit over total sales

AQI

Asset quality index is measure as (noncurrent assets-PP&E) over total assets

SGI

Sales growth index is measured as total sales

DEPI

Depreciation index is measured as depreciation divided by (depreciation + net PP&E)

SGAI

Selling, General & Administrative expense index is measured as SG&A/revenues. The SG&A represents all
commercial expenses of operation incurred in the regular course of business pertaining to the securing of operating income

TATA

Total accruals to total assets is measured as (working capital-cash)-depreciation/total assets

LVGI

The leverage index is measured as total debt over total assets. The total debt is calculated as the debt in
current liabilities plus the total long-term debt
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Panel C. Variables of the credit rating regression
Variable
RATINGS

Definition
S&P Quality Ranking is an appraisal of past performance of a stock's earnings and dividends and the stock's relative standing
as of a company's current fiscal year-end. Growth and stability of earnings and dividends are key elements in establishing
Standard & Poor's quality rankings for Common/Ordinary Stock. In the sample, firms have ratings of A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C, D,
I
range them from 1 to 8, where 1 being the lowest rating and 8 being the highest rating

LITIGATIONR
CHANGELITIGATION
R

Measurement of litigation risk from the regression
The change of litigation risk measured by the model from time t-1 to
time t

LITIGATIONR2

The level of litigation risk squared

FIRMSIZE

The firm size is measured by the log of the samples' sales/turnover (net). The sales/turnover (net) represents gross sales
reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers

CAPSTRUC

The capital structure is a ratio of total debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) over equity. The shareholders' equity
represents the common and preferred shareholders' interest in the company

ROA

The return on asset is measured as the ratio of net income over total assets. The net income represents the fiscal period
income or loss reported by a company after subtracting expenses and losses from all revenues and gains

ROE

The return on equity is measured as net income over total shareholders' equity

OANCF

The operating activities net cash flow represents the net change in cash from all items classified in the operating activities
section on a cash flow statement

INTCOV

The interest coverage is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over interest or related expense
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
This table presents descriptive statistics used in the regression.
Panel A. Variables in the model of litigation risk
WC

FINR
K

VOLAT
ILITY

7.728
7.210
0.495
1402.261

277.856
15.839
38.106
3080.664

0.224
0.001
0.132
0.237

299262476.55

1966334.75

9490493.55

0.056

Kurtosis
Skewness

226.290
12.453

37826.811
194.490

7005.353
-68.939

0.604
1.256

Range
Minimum

626550.352
0.001

273499.264
-769.316

393844.000
-329795.000

0.996
0.000

Maximum

626550.353

272729.948

64049.000

0.996

1.143
0.133
0.008
25.803
665.77
0
8089.4
23
82.079
3000.0
00
-1.000
2999.0
00

MKVALT
Variables in litigation risk measurement
Mean
3948.170
Standard Error
88.946
Median
389.975
Standard Deviation
17299.205
Sample Variance

BKMK

PE

GP

RD INTEN

BM-score

13.225
0.556
14.081
108.201

1046.618
24.089
113.424
4685.195

0.054
0.001
0.000
0.193

-3.803
0.704
-2.133
136.892

11707.553

21951052.88

0.037

18739.536

985.879
12.980

193.387
12.168

940.420
22.135

25306.578
-148.122

11176.000
-3479.000

130131.000
-6887.000

12.853
-0.010

27330.015
-24030.229

7697.000

123244.000

12.843

3299.786
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Panel A (1). Correlations

SUED

SUED
1

MK
VAL
T

CHANGEMK
TVALT

BKMK

WC

FINR
K

VOLATIL
ITY

PE

GP

RD
INT
EN

BMscore

Big

Small

FPS
prox
y

MKVALT
CHANGEMK
TVALT
BKMK
WC

0.1637
0.0741

1
0.5641

1

-0.0028
0.0652

-0.0012
0.2571

-0.0007
0.1582

1
-0.0002

1

FINRK

-0.0480

0.0529

0.0257

0.0099

-0.008

1

VOLATILIT
Y
PE

-0.0053

-0.0048

-0.0026

0.0798

-0.002

0.0179

1

-0.0097

0.0149

0.0170

-0.0006

0.0026

0.0047

-0.0026

1

GP
RD INTEN

0.1658
0.0645

0.8747
-0.0308

0.4019
-0.0155

-0.0012
-0.0015

0.1636
-0.002

0.0473
-0.128

-0.0042
0.0060

0.0074
-0.0275

1
-0.0378

1

BMscore

-0.0130

0.0019

0.0011

0.0000

0.0002

0.0004

-0.0002

0.0010

0.0016

0.0004

1

Big
Small

0.1730
-0.1705

0.3574
-0.1304

0.1857
-0.0656

-0.0030
0.0089

0.1128
-0.050

0.1746
-0.131

-0.0122
0.0339

0.0273
-0.0345

0.3353
-0.1259

-0.092
0.0963

0.0052
0.0043

1
-0.3333

1

FPS proxy

0.1801

0.0222

0.0128

-0.0034

0.0507

-0.146

-0.0033

-0.0094

0.0166

0.2757

0.0011

-0.0389

-0.0032
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1

Panel B. Variables in the credit rating regression
FIRMSIZE

CAPSTRUC

ROA

ROE

OANCF

INTCOV

Mean

2.4600

0.5238

-0.0463

-0.0307

394.9673

44.7322

Standard Error

0.0053

0.3446

0.0047

0.0592

13.0409

7.3142

Median

2.4875

0.3517

0.0221

0.0801

27.1815

1.5186

Standard Deviation

1.0337

67.0278

0.9202

11.5062

2536.3815

1422.5660

Sample Variance

1.0685

4492.7196

0.8468

132.3937

6433230.9899

2023694.0205

Kurtosis

0.6012

9131.8455

7925.0196

4935.2396

752.4882

3223.3465

Skewness

-0.3395

-71.6829

-80.7749

4.5688

16.3924

42.6775

Range

8.6695

11380.3737

104.8468

1821.0922

240291.0000

175475.0000

Minimum

-3.0000

-7811.0000

-100.0140

-819.7857

-110560.0000

-54263.0000

Maximum

5.6695

3569.3737

4.8328

1001.3065

129731.0000

121212.0000
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Panel B (1). Correlations
Ratings
Ratings

LITIGATIONR

CHANGELITIGATIONR

FIRMSIZE

CAPSTRUC

ROA

ROE

OANCF

INTCOV

1

LITIGATIONR

0.0681

1

CHANGELITIGATIONR

0.0061

0.6902

1

FIRMSIZE

0.4508

0.1045

0.0055

1

CAPSTRUC

0.0029

0.0005

-0.0001

0.0035

1

ROA

0.1146

0.0012

-0.0027

0.1637

0.0010

1

ROE

0.0130

0.0002

0.0002

0.0165

-0.4529

0.0011

1

OANCF

0.1790

0.0863

0.0097

0.2794

0.0006

0.0200

0.0031

1

INTCOV

0.0456

0.0029

0.0011

0.0436

-0.0003

0.0286

0.0029

0.0010

1
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Table 3
Lawsuits data set description.
The Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) has 3, 864 total Filings on the date of writing.
Panel A: Number of lawsuits by year

Federal Securities Class Action Litigation
1996-YTD
Number of Lawsuits

600

498

500
400

242

300
200

174

209 216

265

228 239

182
120

110

177

223

167 175 188 152 166

133

100
0

Year

(Source: data in the graph collected on the SCAC website)
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Panel B: Number of lawsuits by sector

Conglomerates

Number of lawsuits

21

Transportation

43

Utilities

71

Capital Goods

95

Energy

105

Consumer Non-Cyclical

107

Basic Materials

114

Consumer Cyclical

153

Healthcare

516

Financial

737

Services

772

Technology

1081
0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

(Source: data in the graph collected on the SCAC website)
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Table 4
Models of litigation risk.
This table represents the FPS only model in comparison to the multivariate models with firm characteristics variables.
Model 1 is the probit model with the FPS variable. Model 2 adds firm characteristics with specific values, and Model 3
adds variables indicating firm size effect and the earnings management. Model 4 includes all variables. ***,**,and *
indicate z-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The z-values are based on robust standard errors that control for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Marginal effects of the coefficients are reported below the coefficients
in Model 4.
Sued=β0+β1 (FPSPROXY)+ε
Sued=β0+β1 (FPSPROXY)+β2 (MKVALT)+ β3 (BKMK)+β4 (WC)+β5 (FINRK)+β6 (VOLATILITY)+β7 (PE)+β8 (GP)+β9 (RDINTEN)+ε
Sued=β0+β1 (FPSPROXY)+β2 (BMSCORE)+β3 (BIG)+β4 (SMALL)+ε
Sued=β0+β1 (FPSPROXY)+β2 (MKVALT)+ β3 (BKMK)+β4 (WC)+β5 (FINRK)+β6 (VOLATILITY)+β7 (PE)+β8 (GP)+β9 (RDINTEN)
+β10 (BMSCORE)+β11 (BIG)+β12 (SMALL)+ε
Model 1
INTERCEPT
FPSPROXY
MKVALT
BKMK

-0.9110
0.5184

Model 2
***
***

-0.9371
0.4854
0.0000049
-0.00202

Model 3
***
***
***
**

-0.9425
0.5620

Model 4
***
***

-0.8594

***

0.0000

***

0.4930

***

0.1518965

***

0.0000019

**

0.0000005

**

-0.00139
-0.00040

WC
FINRK

0.0000286
-0.19347

***
***

0.00000947

**

2.71E-06

**

-0.39147

***

-0.11225

***
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VOLATILITY

-0.000454

**

0.000028
0.000008

PE

-0.000126

GP

0.000040

RDINTEN

0.143819

BMSOCDRE

**
***
***
-0.00020

BIG

0.41641

SMALL

-0.5129161

***
***
***

-0.000218

***

-0.000063

***

0.000028

***

0.000008

***

0.274727

***

0.0787736

***

-0.00021

**

-0.00006

**

0.32509

***

0.09905

***

-0.538201

***

-0.1369096

***

Pseudo R2

0.0286

0.0564

0.0748

0.0896

Observation Count

37827

37827

37827

37827
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Table 5
Models of credit ratings.
This table represents the regression of credit ratings on litigation risk and other control variables.
Model 1 is the regression on the level of litigation risk. Model 2 adds the change in litigation risk
and the litigation risk squared. Model 3 includes all control variables. ***,**,and * indicate p-values
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The p-values are based on robust standard errors that control for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Ratings=β0+β1 (LITIGATIONR)+ε
Ratings=β0+β1 (LITIGATIONR)+β2 (CHANGELITIGATIONR)+ β3 (LITIGATIONR2)+ε
Ratings=β0+β1 (LITIGATIONR)+β2 (CHANGELITIGATIONR)+ β3 (LITIGATIONR2)+β4 (FIRMSIZE)
+β5 (CAPSTRUC)+β6 (ROA)+β7 (ROE)+β8 (OANCF)+β9 (INTCOV)+ε
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

INTERCEPT

3.5065

***

4.1471

***

LITIGATIONR

0.0509

***

0.8519

***

CHANGELITIGATIONR
LITIGATIONR2

-0.00639

**

0.00220

***

1.9295

***

0.00177

FIRMSIZE

0.61943

CAPSTRUC

0.00011

ROA

0.07008

***

ROE

0.00103

*

OANCF

0.00004

***

INTCOV

0.00003

***

Adjusted R2

0.0046

0.0678

0.2087

Observation Count

37827

37827

37827

***
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